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Abstract Digital rights management solutions are today quite widespread. Their cost is still
quite expensive, and thus in many cases, their application is limited to specific business
cases. On the other hand, the market still offers large cases where scalable DRM solutions
would find their applicability, for example the management of complex cross media content
such as the one used for the educational content, for electronic medical record, etc. In this
paper, the focus is on reducing DRM costs by solving scalability problems lying behind the
complexity of granting authorizations and performing verification for a large number of
users, content and rights associated with them. The proposed solution is based on the
exploitation of the DHT P2P network and storage to cope with verification and grant
authorization. The paper reports the structure of the DRM solutions, the details for including
the DHT P2P into the DRM architecture. The paper also reports details on how the proposed
P2P DRM solution can be integrated into traditional DRM solutions. The provided exper-
imental results have proved the reduction of costs, the scalability against the aforementioned
cases. The studies and solutions reported in this paper have been worked out and validated
on top of MPEG-21/AXMEDIS DRM solutions and tools. On the other hand, the solution is
general enough to be adapted in other DRM solutions.
Keywords DRM complexity . DRMP2P.MPEG-21 . DHT. AXMEDIS . Rights controls .
Media distribution and protection . Rights control of electronic medical record
1 Introduction
Digital rights management, DRM, solutions are today quite widespread in industrial appli-
cations, for example those of: Apple, Microsoft Windows Media DRM, Adobe DRM, and
for others see [17]. Some standard solutions have been also defined such as OMA (Open
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Mobile Alliance, [15], MPEG-21 [26], MPEG-21/AXMEDIS DRM [12, 13]. Most of the
above-mentioned DRM solutions can cope only with specific combinations of media
formats, distribution channels, and devices. They have a limited or absent interoperability
among one another. In terms of licensing, most of these DRM solutions allow
exploiting/controlling only a limited number of rights for each digital content and therefore
they allow exploiting only a limited number of business models. For instance, they can
control the content playing on the selected platform which the content has been bought for
and have no or limited flexibility in controlling the rights regarding editing and changing the
content or single elements of complex rich content. The present usage of DRM solutions is
quite limited to some business models, while for other applications, the DRM solutions
could be the only viable solution to preserve the privacy and control a large number of rights.
The standardization efforts (such as MPEG and OMA) focused on defining common
frameworks where a larger number of rights maybe defined, MPEG-21 [20, 27], OMA
[15, 22]. Among the standards, in terms of flexibility and interoperability, the MPEG-21 is
one of the most promising, it can deal with: license (formalized in some REL, Right
Expression Language) and the protection information called Intellectual Property
Management and Protection (IPMP) [21].
Recently, new challenges are demanding to DRM capabilities to control and manage
complex digital content (called cross media and/or rich media content), for example for the
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) (typically produced and kept from hospital and doctors) or
for Personal/patient Health Record, PHR; and for delivering valuable and complex educational
courses, etc. The protection and DRM of complex cross media content has been discussed in
[9]. These kinds of content are typically interactive with several types of media interrelated files
inside: audio, video, games, document, etc., glued and/or formalized as eBook/ePub, SCORM,
MPEG-21, HTML5, MXF, NewsML, etc. Some of them are distributed in some binary format
such as ISOMEDIA and/or some ZIP coding as NewsML and ePub, see [12, 13]. Details about
PHR and the needed protection models are reported in [14, 16].
Users expect to access and work on this kind of content from different devices according
to different licensing/business models (e.g., accessing, renting, pay per play, pay per use, all
you can eat, passing the content to friends and getting some bonus for it). The usage of the
above described content kinds (such as the EMR or rich media) implies to provide authen-
tication of content elements and secure protection of personal information, and, at the same
time, it has to be possible to grant the possibility of adding and changing information to
some qualified users. For example, when the doctor gets access to the EMR and needs to add
new comments to the analysis results, and/or the description of a disease. Final users are
interested in granting some rights to other users for limited time; to a new doctor, to the
analyst, etc.; to move the content from one device to another, at home and/or on the street if
the content access is performed in emergency events, etc. Typically, both educational
packages as well as the EMRs are constituted by several files and text (maybe produced
by several actors, different teachers, different hospitals), which in turn can be augmented
with other files and annotation in some conditions by authorized personnel only. At the same
time, some elements of the rich content should be accessible for a limited number of
authorized people; the organization can enrich the EMR automatically and provide updates
to all the authorized people, etc. Therefore, the rich cross media content should cope with
different rights related to both different parts/elements and the whole package. Therefore, the
package is evolving over time, while some copies should evolve as well, together with the
main copy. The protection of the complex rich media may be encrypted with different keys
on different files. Set of files can be located as nested levels into the encryption model and in
agreement to the protection information and coding [13].
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Therefore, in the above described cases, the number of rights per content can be high, and
thus the challenging scalability problem of DRM solutions has to manage content on
demand at a reasonable cost. Thus, the solution has to cope with hundreds millions of users,
several millions of different content items, to control a large set of possible rights for each
content and user (i.e., adapt, play, access, embed, export), on different devices, etc. Most of
the present DRM solutions cope with complexity and management costs settling such
aspects by a compromise on the number of users for service, and/or on the numbers of
content per service, and/or on the number of rights per content and thus of licenses, on the
limited kinds of business models, on the security level and robustness with respect to the
attacks, etc. The adopted business model strongly influences the cost of the solutions, since it
may relax some constrains regarding the verification of the devices, the authentication of the
users, the production of grant authorization at each transaction; for example when licenses
storage on the final user devices is permitted.
Typically, rights are formalized as logic constraints in licenses which in turn have to be
processed as logical rules in order to compute if a given user may have the grant to exercise
his right on a given content at a given time and in a given location, etc. Licenses and logic
constraints defining rights can be connected one another with chains [21]. For example,
when a protected content package includes several other content packages with different
rights, or when a license for distribution allows the distributor to issue licenses for playing to
final user customers, etc. In any case, the proliferation of rights to be granted and controlled
on the device implies to cope with huge amount of licenses to be stored, distributed and
processed in real time (on demand). For example, (i) when millions of people get access to
the same sport event content in short time; and/or (ii) when millions of people are accessing
content with different authorizations and from different locations and devices. In these cases,
the complexity of the problem is mainly on the information related to the grant authorization
(rights), which may imply the corresponding computation of license logic, but only after the
verification of the user/device’s identity, that is the verification/certification process.
The complexity and costs for granting authorization according to some license is typically
demanded to a single central service that has to provide: (i) suitable storage for the
information, (ii) computational capabilities to compute the logical rules, and (iii) networking
capabilities to satisfy millions of users requesting the grant authorization at almost the same
time. On the other hand, if the workload during the rush hours has to be met, the hardware
infrastructure has to be dimensioned for the worst cases, with corresponding costs.
In this paper, the focus is on reducing DRM costs by solving the scalability problems
behind the complexity of granting authorizations and on performing verification for a large
number of users, content and rights associated with them. The studies and the solutions
reported in this paper have been worked out and validated on top of MPEG-21/AXMEDIS
DRM solutions and tools [10, 11]. AXMEDIS has been defined as a consortium of leading
European digital content producers, integrators, aggregators, and distributors, together with
information technology companies and research groups (see http://www.axmedis.org). The
proposed solution is based on the exploitation of a DHT P2P network and storage to cope
with verification and grant authorization.
In literature, the usage of P2P network with DRM has been already addressed to store
protected objects [1, 7]. [7] has described a P2P network for content distribution where the
DRM protected content can be distributed. In that case, the P2P network is only used to
share content and not verification and licensing information. The solution presented in this
paper complements the solution proposed in [7] which was limited to the exploitation of P2P
for content sharing and distribution. In [1–3], the P2P network based on DHT has been used
to index rights and metadata allowing users to search content integrated with licenses (the so
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called governed resources) by looking for specific license issuers, right grants or principals
(right recipient user) in the P2P. This last case of iDRM [3], the proposed P2P solution
presents unsolved complexities in the DRM management, since the verification and authen-
tication activities are still performed by referring to a central server, without exploiting the
P2P network. Moreover, the iDRM solution presented a limited flexibility since licenses are
supposed to be simple and independent one another, in any case managed in the license
server.
On the other hand, the solution proposed in this paper can cope with (i) the user and
device authentication, (ii) flexible licensing including groups of people and devices (i.e., the
domains), and licenses with temporal and consumption constraints (i.e., a licenses valid for a
month, a license valid for 4 plays), and with licenses depending on other licenses; More
details will be provided later in the paper. Therefore, the proposed solution is general enough
to be adapted by many different DRM solutions and it has been assessed in terms of
performance against critical scenarios. To this end, the paper is organized as follows.
& Section 2 offers a short introduction to the DRM Scenarios for content distribution. It is
used to highlight main entities, services and relationships of a DRM solution for content
distribution and rights management.
& Section 3 describes the AXMEDIS DRM solution and services in terms of service
graphs and action diagrams. This allows stressing the points where a DRM solution
can be adapted to exploit the P2P capabilities, so as to reduce the complexity and costs of
the DRM service, considering scenarios related to the user verification and grant
authorization from licenses.
& Section 4 presents the details regarding the insertion of the DHT P2P into the DRM
solutions for managing the grant authorizations, and not for managing content as in [7],
and [1, 3]. The proposed solution is general enough to be adopted in other DRM
solutions since the information stored into the P2P refers to the grant authorization
and to the certification of device which are suitable for almost all DRM solutions.
& In Section 5, the performance analysis of the DRM P2P solution is presented. To this
aim, the declination of the DHT P2P into the specific cases is described by stressing the
most relevant parameters and features that have been tuned during the simulations and
experiments.
& Section 5.1 reports the experimental results that allowed highlighting the parameters’
values of the DHT P2P which are suitable for two applicative scenarios: the distribution
of media content, and the management of security for EMR/PHR. The work presented
on this paper does not claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the security and protection
problems of EMR, but only stresses that DRM P2P can be one of the needed technol-
ogies to reduce DRM complexity and costs.
& Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Digital rights management scenarios
At present, there is a number of content format packages that may include several basic
digital resources (documents, video, images, audio, 3D, animations, etc.) such as: MXF,
AXMEDIS / MPEG-21 [21], SCORM [19], ePub, NewsML, etc., that could be used as
DRMed packages for containing EMR and/or learning content. Packages can wrap digital
resources with other related information (e.g., metadata, identification codes) so as to make
them ready for delivery and access right control. Such solutions should be more flexible, if
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compared with proprietary solutions where the DRM is only applied to the single resources.
In fact, in those cases, the single element and as well as the packages may have distinct
protection information (encryption models and tools) and rights/licenses, maybe issued by
different institutions / industries.
On the other hand, a general view of DRM solutions is needed to understand the main
mechanisms as reported in this section. Thus, the typical content production and distribution
scenario, which synthesizes the most relevant phases from content packaging to content
distribution and licensing, is shown in Fig. 1.
The Distributor arranges a contract/agreement with the Content Producer (the value chain
is more articulated, but the details are not relevant in this context). The Distributor may
create and protect the produced content package to keep a certain level of control about the
exploitation of rights (the hospital or a doctor can play the role of distributor). The
Distributor may make business by allowing final-users/consumers to exploit specific rights
on content (e.g., ‘play’, ‘print’, ‘adapt’ which typically includes ‘modify’). The provided
rights, for a given final user, are formalized as logical rules into the license (L, in the figure),
such as: authorize user UserID to play content ContentID for D days/months, etc., or to print
content twice or more times, or to adapt them only in Germany, etc.
In order to enforce protection, the digital resources are packaged for the distribution by
using some encryption algorithms. The Protection Information (P, in the figure, includes key
and algorithm ID for decryption of the content) has to reach the final user device in order to
allow the player/device to unprotect/open the digital resource and/or the package, but only
when it is authorized according to the license, and only after verifying the security of the
device and the authentication of the user/device. The information for content decryption is
typically called Protection Information or IPMP as in MPEG-21 [21]. In order to permit the
exploitation of rights formalized in the license (L) only, the player/device has to verify if it
can be authorized according to the license, for example by contacting the License Server. In
this first case, the License Server processes the license database to verify if the Authorization
can be granted to that specific player, device and user. Alternatively, as a second case, a copy
Fig. 1 Basic DRM: content production/protection and licensing
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of the License could be sent to the player only once, when the grant authorization is
requested.
Every time a right is exploited, the involved distributors/producers may need to get back
an evidence for their Administrative Services (for example, bill sending). This piece of
information can be easily recovered in solutions forcing the player/device to contact the
License Server for each grant authorization. In those cases, an Action Log record (Event
Report in MPEG-21) can be issued by the player/device and reported/saved on some secure
server. The information on the user Action Log record can be used for statistics about
content usage, to adjust the service, to make market analysis, to monitor the security and it
may help in tallying possible attacks.
On the user’s player/device, both authorization/license (L), and protection pieces of
information (P) are needed to exploit the rights on the content. They can reach the content
together or in separate phases.
On such grounds, as to the EMR management, the possibility of keeping separate
protection information and authorization is important, since new licensing should be re-
leased by users and/or institutions, for a given temporary period, etc., with no need to change
the protection coding of the content. For example, allowing a special consultation, a given
need to add new information, etc.
2.1 Computational complexity of DRM scenarios
On the basis of the above description, it is evident that the package/content formats, the
license, the protection information, the protocols, and the authentication/verification pro-
cesses exert a significant influence on the DRM architecture and the complexity of the
distribution channel, and thus on the workload assigned to the Licensing and Verification
Servers. The DRM distribution complexity is related to the number of protected content,
number of users, number of licenses for each user and content, the maximum number of
requests which may arrive at the same time on the servers. In further details, we can analyze
some typical cases.
In the event of content on demand, with millions of users per millions of content, in the
worst case, we have: an order or 1012 grants/verification to be provided. On the other hand,
in a more realistic case: some millions of users may request the authorization in the same
short time window, when they decide to acquire/pay a new content via some content on
demand service (the access at the same sport event, premier primetime film). In this case, the
content is typically protected once, and accessed by millions of users which the grant is
provided for on a singular basis and for a single play, which means to play it for a few hours.
In this case, the above DRM solution is not very efficient and thus high costs on the
licensing servers have to be afforded to guarantee the computational capability, the network
bandwidth. The same user, typically does not request the same authorization several times, it
typically requests every time different content items and use them only once. For this case,
the conditional access systems, CAS, adopted by the broadcasters, have a lower complexity
since the Protection Information is broadcasted to proprietary devices that are locally
verified by using a smartcard. This approach refers to certified and typically embedded
devices, and does not take into account an open player on PC to be verified with respect to
the Verification/Licensing Servers. The CAS solutions are not viable for the analyzed case of
EMR or for multiple accesses to the same content, as it happens with educational purposes.
In the event of content distribution like Apple iTune and Adobe, millions of users select a
limited number of content in life span among the provided range of some million content
items. The content is licensed to users forever or for a long period; thus the same content is
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played/accessed by the same user several times on his/her own certified device. Therefore,
on a daily basis only some users perform a transaction to get the first access and thus the
license and protection information to the stored into the device. As to Apple iTune or Adobe,
the authorization is provided only in the event of first access (thus reducing costs on the
Licensing Server). Therefore at the first access/authorization, the license and protection
information is stored (or cached) into the device, bringing about a reduction of security. This
case is a clear compromise to reduce complexity at the expense of security. On the other
hand, this solution provides users with content access at a reasonable price, granting also the
possibility of exploiting rights off line (namely, with no connection).
When coming to rich media as EMR, a high level of security should be guaranteed and
for this reason the caching of license/rights and/or protection information should not be
allowed. In the sub-case of rich media and cross media distribution for educational purposes,
the security level can be lower. As to EMR, in a country with 80 million users (which is the
population with social security number in Germany), every day, a million grant authoriza-
tions to access content may be needed and thus hundred thousands of new licenses should be
issued by users, doctors, etc. This increases the complexity of the information to be
processed by the License Server. For example, a European doctor may have an average of
280 patients, whereas the same number could be higher for doctors living in other countries.
Each person may have an average of 3 doctors (typically 2000 people per dentist, 1000 per
pharmacist, 500 per pathologist), this means to have at least 240 million stable licenses being
present on the License Server, plus those produced for temporary accesses by specialists,
hospitals, analysis cabinets, etc. Moreover, the rich media modeling of the patient health
record may be made of several content items with their corresponding licenses and rights (to
protect, print, access, ..), protection model, encryption, etc. Moreover, an EMR may be made
of 10 files/elements, each of them produced by different Hospital/Doctor and thus they have
different licenses. A complexity for storage of about a number of doctors per
patience*number of elements per content*number of rights per element, thus billions of
rights.
As to the grant authorization, the above described DRM system has a linear complexity in
terms of maximum number of verifications and authorizations that can be served per day
and/or almost simultaneously. Where “served” means to receive the request, retrieve the
correct license, compute the license, and provide the results. Moreover, the algorithm for
computing and providing the authorizations/verifications has to produce results in real time,
this implies high expenses for the infrastructure, including computational and bandwidth
costs.
In further details, the license management and the provision of the related grant autho-
rizations cope with:
1. License production and saving on the License Server, for all users and rights. Thus,
database space and query resources are consumed;
2. Solving the grant authorization requests which arrive from both players and the
network (both network and CPU capabilities are stressed), implying to perform in real
time the following activities:
& (i) receiving the request for grant authorization, for a specific user, about a content,
to exploit a right;
& (ii) verification of the player/device with respect to the data contained in the central
database of million device descriptors (as hardware and software fingerprints) – e.g.,
each user may have multiple devices, PC, TV, mobile, etc.;
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& (iii) estimating grant authorization which consists in searching and processing the
returned license(s) (one or more of them associated with the same content, user,
right). The search should be performed on billions of records, while the computation
is typically limited to a few of them; The phase of processing licenses for computing
the grant authorization can be performed only once and the result is stored in some
cache;
& (iv) communicating grant authorization results to the requester.
The above discussion on grant authorization phases highlights that among the four phases the
most expensive ones are those related to the verification (i), (ii) and to the communication (iv).
Phase (iii) has a computational complexity depending on the database costs for retrieving the
licenses/rights, and can be reduced by pre-computing and caching them. The storage of licenses
cannot be avoided and the present database solutions are much faster than communications.
On the basis of this analysis, the main idea of the solution presented in this paper consists
in the adoption a P2P network among final users’ players and distributors’ servers to reduce
the communication complexity and costs for: (i) device/player verification, (ii) grant autho-
rization provision. The proposed solution can be regarded as an affordable solution to
transform a centralized DRM architecture in a fault tolerant and cheaper solution in terms
of infrastructure and connection costs since a large part of connections and processing
activities are delegated to the P2P network. The proposed solution is viable to be used in
large scale problems as it occurs with cross media content where (i) several users are
engaged in accessing licenses, etc., like in educational content and EMR/PHR (for example,
doctors and patients are interested in licensing the access to other doctors and/or family
members); (ii) a number of users may be interested in having access to a limited number of
content (for example, a family restricted view of the EMR).
In the next sections, the above described problems are analyzed in details to stress the
complexity of DRM management and where the P2P solution can be integrated.
3 AXMEDIS DRM solution and services
In this section, the most important aspects of the AXMEDIS MPEG-21 DRM solutions are
reported to highlight the device and tools involved from production up to the client side.
This section lays the bases for an explanation on the needed changes to introduce the P2P
capabilities into DRM solutions. A general description of the AXMEDIS architecture can be
recovered from [11] and the full specification from the AXMEDIS web site http://
www.axmedis.org. The DRM solution is presented while highlighting the mechanisms for
grant authorization, verification / authentication of devices, and license production. On the
other hand, even if the solution proposed has been designed and developed for AXMEDIS
MPEG-21 solution, it can be applied to other DRM solutions since providing grant autho-
rizations is core part of any DRM solution [26].
In the AXMEDIS MPEG-21 DRM, the role of the License Server is played by the
AXMEDIS PMS Service (Protection Manager Support). It allows any storing of licenses
and authorization granting to the device/players. It is also the primary access for content
producers and distributors since it provides services for license store and verification, and
also support to revoke licenses, content, tools and users. Some of these services are provided
by AXCS (AXMEDIS Certifier and Supervisor) and conveniently made accessible via the
PMS which establishes the secure communication channel between the Production Tools
and Final User’s Tools (players/devices). Most services exchange sensitive information
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(such as certificates, protection information, grants, action logs, etc.) which has to be
transferred along a secure channel in order to avoid simple sniffing attacks. The AXCS
provides services such as: content object ID assignment, user ID assignment, access to
Action Log reports and statistics about usage data. The AXCS collects and keeps the
information concerning the registered objects, users, devices, etc., and therefore it allows
the management of black lists. It also stores the Protection Information of each protected
object, and the list of actions performed on them, the so called Action Log database, which
allows production of reports and statistics.
The User Registration Service allows the registration of users (final and business) in
collaboration with the AXCS and the AXMEDIS Certification Authority, CA. The registra-
tion portal allows the collection of information about users, regardless of their unique ID’s
assignment and it provides certificates.
The models and tools mentioned in the scenarios are differently exploited by the different
devices and actors of the value chain. For example, “Producer” and “Distributor” have to be
understood as roles rather than effective entities. A User may become producer of a content
and then distributor of the same content. The tools mentioned above refer to generic
functionalities, as described below. The main scenarios are reported hereafter according to
the AXMEDIS tools and web services, in the context of two main scenarios, namely
production towards distribution and distribution towards usage. And, in particular for:
& Production to Distribution means the activities of (i) protecting content, (ii) distribut-
ing content to one or more distributors, (iii) licensing to the distributor the rights to issue
licenses to final users, so as to allow them accessing the content. For example, issuing a
license with certain rights to a distributor so that it can issue licenses with the same rights
to final users.
& Distribution and Usage means the activities of content distribution by producing
specific licenses for rights exploitation (e.g., content access, print) to final users.
3.1 Activities of producers with respect to distributors
In Fig. 2, the role of the Producers (Content Producer and Protection Tools) with their
Production Tools and two related Distributors (see Distribution Services), is presented. The
Producer may perform the following operations with respect to the above mentioned services
and tools:
& User Registration for content producers and distributors. The registration may provide
them with a unique production ID and release a certificate from the Certificate Authority.
& Tool Registration to register the tools used by the Producer for producing content object
packages, licenses, and to revoke licenses. In general, different users may use the same
production tool, so that the certificate is managed at the User’s level, whether this
distinction is needed by the control and/or revocation process and tools.
& User and Tool Authentication is performed to authenticate the user and tool every time a
connection with the PMS is performed. For example before requesting the grant autho-
rization, posting a license, revoking a license, getting action logs, getting protection
information, etc. The authentication is based on certificates which, by using the stored
key, allow the building of a protected channel to exchange sensible information such as:
user information, device fingerprint (a set of hardware and software identification
numbers). A simplification can be performed when User and Tools are considered a
unique element, as it occurs with the decoder and the user’s smartcard.
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& Object ID Assignment, Object Registration and Protection Information Posting oper-
ations are performed every time a new content object is published and protected. The
Producer registers the object, by requesting an Object unique ID. Then the content can
be protected and registered, also providing the Protection Information (i.e., IPMP
settings of MPEG-21, protection tools and specific key(s) used) and in some cases the
metadata.
& License Posting is the activity done by the Producer/Distributor (they are license issuers,
as well) in formalizing the license including rights granted to the Distributor/Final Users.
The Distributor licenses typically include the possibility of: (i) content reselling (by
producing final user licenses) according to different business models, (ii) content
adaptation to make it suitable for different distribution channels and devices, (iii) content
encapsulation (meaning, to include it into an object in other collections, and into an
already in place patient health record), etc. Therefore, the Distributor may produce and
post on PMS only licenses according to the license parameters defined by the Producer.
Similarly, a license issuer may revoke the produced licenses, thus removing the license
from the PMS. Only the Producer may revoke the content from the DRM system, putting
the Object ID in the black list of AXCS Service, thus removing the possibility of
managing, posting licenses, providing protection information and granting authoriza-
tions for it.
3.2 Activities of distributors with respect to final users
Figure 3 depicts the point of view of a DRM Client and Player (a DRM enabled tool) with
respect to the distribution of content performed by two Distributors and other DRM services.
In this case, the actions of a final User are performed by means of the DRM Client and
Player. The User may have one or more devices/tools. The DRM Client/player typically
carries out the following operations in addition to the User Registration, Tool Registration,
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User and Tool Authentication, Grant Authorization, which have been already described in
Section 3.1:
& Grant Authorization is requested by a DRM enabled tool registered in advance. The
grant authorization is requested to the PMS, and, at the connection with the PMS, the
tool and the user are authenticated and verified via their certificate and fingerprints. If the
authentication/verification is positive, the grant request can be processed by the PMS
which in turn contact the AXCS to get information about tool ID and status, User ID and
status, etc. If no problems arise, the license is processed and in the case of matching from
the requested grant and the available licenses, the grant is provided. Once the grant is
provided, the corresponding action is communicated to the AXCS in the form of Action
Log record.
& Query, Get Object and Set Contract. The final user may go to any Distributor to make
some query for selecting the content objects. In order to enjoy the content object, some
rights have to be acquired by the user setting a “contract” with the Distributor according
to some business models (e.g., monthly rate, pay per play, single access limited in time).
According to the established contract, the Distributor can issue a corresponding License
and post it to PMS for that user.
& Do Payment. According to the business model, the Distributor starts the process to
obtain the payment from the user. In the case of patient health record, this feature has no
sense. The Distributor periodically verifies the status of the payment to enable the
service to its client.
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4 DRM with P2P for managing grant authorization process
On the basis of the above presented complexity analysis for the DRM solutions, it is evident
that the most critical aspects in terms of complexity / costs focus on to the grant authoriza-
tion requests and related verifications. The request arrives from the tools/players to the PMS
via the network with the aim of performing in real time the following steps:
1. opening a protected channel by using the available user/tool certificates and related
passwords;
2. receiving and interpreting the request for grant authorization (user ID, content ID,
tool ID, requested right and related constraints);
3. verification / authentication of player/device on the basis of an Enabling Code
estimated on the basis of (i) the player/device fingerprint provided during the
first certification/registration of the device/player, and of (ii) the actions performed
on the player itself (e.g., play, access, print, etc.) over time. This code is used to
perform the verification process, perform the player verification, and thus enabling
the player to work in that context and according to its fingerprint and story of the
performed actions. Therefore, the right code has to be provided by the device to
the PMS. If it is not provided the connection is interrupted and the verification /
authentication aborted;
4. estimation of the grant authorization, that consists in searching and processing the
license(s) associated with the user, for that content, in the period, according to the right
for which the grant has been requested. One or more licenses could be recovered to
estimate the grant. For example, (i) the distribution (mother) license issued by the
producer, authorizing the distributor to issue the license for pay per play; (ii) the license
issued by the distributor to formalize the issued right to the final user. A simplification
of this process, can be obtained by directly storing if the requested grant can be provided
or not according to a given user ID, content ID, and right (with parameters), as proposed
in this paper. This is not a strong simplification since almost all DRM solutions (e.g.,
Windows DRM, Apple DRM) does not adopt any chain of licenses as described in case
(i). The possibility of dynamically computing the grant of the user license on the basis of
the distributor license can be used to permit the revocation of the distributor license.
This capability may be a violation of the acquired rights of the final users. So that it is
not commonly considered a desirable functionality.
5. communicating grant authorization results. The process is successfully completed
when the grant authorization computed at point 4 is true, thus enabling to provide the
Protection Information to the device which allows the decrypting of the content and the
exploitation of the requested right. In this context, the player/device has the duty of
enforcing the control of the specific rights to be exploited.
In order to reduce costs, especially as to the most expensive phases of the DRM, the core
idea has been to adopt a P2P to store and retrieve the above mentioned key information
regarding the Enabling Code and the Protection Information (that is the results of the grant
authorization request). The P2P network model and protocol adopted have been a DHT
solution since it may be managed as a distributed database and store of replica, and these
replicas are located in closer nodes in terms of the hash code, that typically are not
geographically closer. Please note that in [3], the P2P network has been used to index rights
and metadata allowing users to search for content, but not as a distributed database for
verification and grant authorization.
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In the proposed solution, as to the Enabling Code, the P2P network may need to store
one code for each device, thus typically O(D*U*K), where: D are the devices per users, K
are the number of replicas, and U the users; thus in our example some hundred millions of
elements.
For the case of the Protection Information the complexity depends on M that is the
number of DHT entries to be stored as accessible for each single right. M is the number of
stored values. For the case of content distribution, the number of content*number of
users*number of rights per content*K, thus billions of rights and information stored. For
the case of patient health record it may be equal to the number of patient*number of doctors
per patience*number of elements per content*number of rights per element*K. Thus billions
of rights and pieces of information can be stored.
The adopted DHT P2P model allowed storing a DHT entry payload for each estimated
hash key of 20 bytes, while the space for storing payload values to be stored/recovered
associated with the key, can be of 1024 bytes. In particular, the data stored into the 1024
bytes have to be protected and thus are:
& a Payload Key of 256 bytes encrypted with RSA by using the public key of the PMS that
can be decrypted only by the private key produced by the PMS for the specific user;
& an effective payload of 768 bytes encrypted with a symmetric algorithm by the Payload
Key encrypted and contained in the first 256 bytes. Variations can be applied in this
phase to increase security by combining the Payload Key in different manners and with
other pieces of information.
In turn, the information stored into the 768 bytes effective payload of the P2P DHT are
the:
& Enabling Code. To this end, the 20 bytes of the DHT key are estimated by using the
hash code of the specific tool/device identification code; namely, the AXTID
(AXMEDIS Tool ID), obtained during the first certification of each specific player
and/or device.
& Protection Information: to this end, the 20 bytes of the DHT key are estimated by using
the hash code of the composed information consisting in: user ID, content ID and of a
coding of right with its parameter. The Protection Information can represent the code for
accessing to one protected content item or to a set of protected content items with the
same model. This approach can be used to manage licenses for channel access. Thus, the
“user ID” can represent a user category or domain and the “content ID” could represent a
content channel, or collection. This generalization is useful for modeling domain
licenses of MPEG-21 and ODRL.
The described solution allows to store and retrieve frequently used information in the
DHT P2P network. Please note that, with the DRM P2P sensitive information is stored in
both the final users’ devices and in the producers’ ones, while the security is guaranteed by
the two encryption steps mechanism. This DHT P2P networks may be set to have data
replica, and they are quite robust to network evolution, but at the same time it may happen
that part of the data could not be accessible in some period of time. On the other hand, the
DRM solution has to maintain his robustness by detecting failures and providing the grant
authorization via the PMS Server in the case of missed data from the DHT P2P. Therefore,
the P2P solution is an additional possibility with respect to the centralized solutions for
DRM grant authorization. This means that, the information related to a new tool certification
and new licenses has to be primarily stored into the central License Server (PMS) (and
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indirectly into the AXCS), and then into the DHT P2P network to reduce the connection
workflow of the PMS. The DHT can also store the Action Log information with the same
modality of the Protection Information. On the other hand, it may happen to recover the
Protection Information from the P2P and to get a miss from recovering the Action Log
information that has also to be updated. Then the DRM model has to decide if the access /
update of this information is needed at each right exploitation or can be delayed for a while,
thus reducing and relaxing the instantaneous precision of rights consumption estimation.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper, the focus is kept on the Enabling Code and Protection
Information when they are managed into the DHT.
To this end, Fig. 4 reports the tool certification process, which is carried out the first time
a new client tool related to a registered person is added and associated to the user account.
The first 7 steps are exactly the same as those performed in the centralized AXMEDIS
MPEG-21 DRM, while the other steps have been added to save the Enabling Code into the
DHT. In the first steps, the PMS Client (in the client device/player) performs a SOAP call (2)
to the PMS Server; the PMS Server performs the certification asking to the AXCS (3) and
(4) and it gets the result (5); such result is transferred to the Client device (6), (7). In order to
keep aligned the DHT, the key is requested from the AXCS DB (9), (10); encrypted (11) and
passed to the DHT (12), (13), (14) and (15).
Figure 5 describes the storing of a new license and the corresponding estimation of the
values to be stored into the DHT. In this case, the phases from 1 to 16 are those of the former
DRM, while the successive phases from 17 to the 27 deal with saving the Protection
Information related to the content, user, license right into the DHT. As a first step, the
PMS Client of the license production tool (namely the AXMEDIS Editor, or the License
Editor, or the AXCP automated production tool [6, 8]) sends the license (1) with a SOAP call
to the PMS Server. The PMS server contacts the AXCS for the verification (5), then the
license is verified (6), (7); the license is evaluated to understand if it is a distribution license
or a final user one (8), (9); different algorithms are used to verify and store such licenses
(10), (11), (12); In the case of final user license, all the licenses data have to recovered and
verified again into the AXCS (13), (14); to send the resulting license ID (15), (16) to the
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Fig. 4 Certification process of DRM P2P
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production client, thus confirming the operation as successful (which is to say, the license
has been produced, it is valid, and in the case of final user license, it is coherent with some
mother licenses). After these phases, the PMS Server autonomously starts a process of
storing the information into the DHT P2P. To this end, it recovers key from the database
(17), (18), (19); encrypts key (20); recovers Protection Information from the AXCS (21),
(22); encrypts the value for the DHT (23), (24); and posts the value corresponding to the
license (User ID, rights, content ID, etc.), namely the protection information into the DHT
P2P (25), (26) and (27).
From the point of view of the client players/devices the acquisition of both the verifica-
tion and the permission information are much simpler. Therefore, the enabled P2P DRM
DHT AXMEDIS player has been developed by implementing a limited number of changes
within the former player. The main changes consisted in adding an independent process to
manage the DHT. The DRM P2P integration is grounded on the fact that the client tools
(players / decoders) first try to perform the tool verification via the P2P DHT network, and
once verified, the grant authorization is requested on the P2P network to get the Protection
Information stored into the DHT as depicted in Fig. 5. If the verification is successfully
performed from the DHT, and yet the grant authorization on the DHT fails for the lack of
data, the client has to restart the process from the DRM PMS central servers. When the
verification on the DHT P2P fails, the client goes directly on the PMS Server to perform the
verification. Thus, the successive step of grant authorization is first tried from the DHT. In
order to realize a more robust P2P network in terms of replica and data availability, every
time a miss is detected the information is put again into the DHT by using sequences similar
to those depicted in the Figs. 4 and 5.
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Fig. 5 Computing and saving protection information related to a grant authorization formalized in a license,
in the case of DRM P2P
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The main goal of the adoption of the DRM P2P is to reduce the PMS Server workload
especially in the event of many “contemporary” requests. This kind of condition could be
fulfilled in a centralized manner by scaling up the PMS Service with multiple PMS Servers,
a balancer, and a large network bandwidth capability. On the other hand, the adoption of a
stronger PMS Server would lead to a cost increase of the DRM infrastructure and manage-
ment, and thus it would limit the global scalability of the DRM.
Moreover, the P2P DHT storage can be directly activated into the client player or as
service into the several devices of the final user and/or of producers (obviously informing the
user during the installation to get the authorization to install the DHT as a stable service).
This latter solution is more reliable and effective to implement the P2P DHT as a service
running in any case, also when the client player is not running; thus increasing the node
availability. The implementation of the P2P node service has been performed by customizing
the Bamboo DHT library [4]. For the Bamboo DHT behavior at regime for long periods of
work, please see [24, 25].
5 DRM P2P performance analysis
The main operations to be performed into the DHT P2P network are related to PUT and GET
the above mentioned pieces of information (i.e., Enabling Code, and Protection
Information). In addition, the removal of the same information could be used to (i) revoke
licenses/content when they are black-listed, out of date or not needed any longer, and (ii)
remove users when they are banned or their registration has expired. This allows keeping
clean the DHT. Moreover, it could be very useful to remove licenses that have ended their
time span; for example the play for two days, the play once for a Video on Demand (that
typically is implemented as a grant to play that content within 24 hours or less), etc. An
explicit removal/delete of the information can be very expensive or unfeasible: P2P nodes
can be offline in the moment of cleaning, thus forcing to repeat the action. On the other hand,
the DHT can be kept clean by imposing a TimeToLive (TTL) for each stored information. For
example, for the Protection Information the license expiration time, and for the Enabling
Code the user/device certificate expiration. Moreover, 1 year license can be more easily
controlled if it is issued as a new license every month, for the next 12 months.
According to the DHT P2P, each node of the P2P network has only a partial view about
the whole stored data in the DHT P2P. In particular, each single node knows its neighboring
nodes (called leaf set) and the routing table to propagate searches. When a node enters in the
network, it contacts a close node and starts creating its view of the leaf set and the routing
table. According to the DHT P2P network model, the insertion/search of every elementary
DHT key-information couple is performed with respect to the node which has the closest ID
with respect to the key to be saved/retrieved. This means that the network allows navigating
from one node to another to perform the put/get operations, according to a specified
algorithm. In general, if the network structure and algorithm are known, the maximum
number of hops to reach a node with a given ID from the starting node ID can be pre-
estimated.
The arrival and departure by a large percentage of the active peers/nodes (the so called
churn) is the most destructive activity in the DHT since the stored data may disappear [18,
24]. To cope with this problem, the DRM DHT P2P networks should have the advantage of
providing a certain degree of robustness by using a number of K replicas distributed in the
neighboring nodes of each node. The adoption of larger values for K increases the proba-
bility of successfully getting an information also in case of large churn. Moreover, the DHT
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P2P network is intrinsically fault tolerant due to data and node redundancy and the lack of a
central server, (e.g., robust with respect to the failure of nodes). It also presents a certain
degree of scalability since the computational complexity for the operations of Get/Put is an
O(Log E), where E is the number of peer elements in the network.
Another very relevant case for DRM P2P solution consists in a large number of DRM
clients and thus of P2P nodes performing their requests at the same time. For example, to
request the grant authorization to access an event or to see a media content. This may happen
just after the withdrawal of a large percentage of nodes. For example, when moving from a
live pay per play event to another, or at the end of the working hours in the doctor office.
In this section, the performance analysis of the above described DRM P2P solution is
analyzed. The work presented in this section does not aim at demonstrating the effectiveness
of Bamboo library that we have used in the development, but at assessing (i) the effective-
ness of the usage of a DHT P2P solution for some DRM critical and specific cases, and (ii)
the identification of reasonable values of DHT parameters to cope with critical conditions
which may occur according to the typical behavior of the users involved in the DRM
applications, and in particular with respect to the churn effect. The specific intention was
to replicate the adopted models into a real implementation where the P2P Library has been
adopted for the DRM.
Therefore, in order to validate the solution in realistic conditions, a large number of nodes
and key-value couple information stored in the DHT should be needed. On the other hand, to
set up a realistic network of millions of devices/users for validation purposes is not feasible,
and in large measure it is neither feasible to have 1000 computers with 10000 nodes each to
perform a scaled simulation. For this reason, some simulation sets have been focused and
performed to recreate the conditions in terms of data per node in which the solution could be
analyzed when large scale data are stored. Details are reported hereafter.
For the simulations, the OverSim simulator (http://www.oversim.org ) has been used. It is
based on OMNeT++ [23]. The advantage of using OMNeT++ consists in its capability to
simulate (i) the communication stack and delays aiming at reproducing the condition of real
applications, and (ii) on top of the communication stack the P2P network with different
routing algorithms. OverSim allows simulating P2P networks with realistic conditions
(creating profiles for describing withdrawals and arrivals of new nodes) with several
different churn models. This churn evolution can be modeled as distribution trend: expo-
nential, random, Pareto, and by imposing different parameters. Figure 6 shows the simula-
Fig. 6 Architecture for P2P DHT
on Oversim
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tion architecture. The Bamboo DHT network (Overlay + DHT) is simulated by OverSim,
and the structure of the underlying network by the communication networks simulation
framework INET. Both packages are additions for the simulation environment OMNeT++.
Churn generator is a module responsible for the disconnection distribution simulation of
participants in the overlay network.
The adoption of the OMNeT++ simulator allowed to simulate the network stack under the
overlay network specifying many parameters, see Table 1, for the most relevant parameters
as Delay, Jitter, and SendQueueLengh. We decided to adopt a coherent model in simulation
with respect to the actual solutions implemented in the player and network. OverSim
provides an implementation of the Bamboo model including the UDP layer. At low level,
the adopted communication protocol has been the UDP, as it has been also used by Bamboo
[25]. In Table 1, the adopted constant component of transmission delay was in the range of
30–50 ms; which is the offset value of the delay [5]. According to OverSim, the delay is
imposed adding to the offset a delay computed on the basis of the simulated 2D network
topology, which means creating a random distribution of positions in a 100 by 100 area and
computing the delays on the basis of the Euclidean distance. The OverSim also adds a delay
according to the packet side, while in the proposed solution the packet size is of 1 kbyte and
therefore this aspect, that also simulates the costs to reassembly data blocks, has a marginal
impact. As a conclusion, the typical maximum value of delay was about 165 ms and the
mean about 100 ms. In the following reported cases, 50 ms has been used as offset delay.
In the simulations, the occurrence of a “missing” (failure in getting a value) from the
DHT may be due to: (i) lack of requested key-value; (ii) lack of network problems due to
connection, etc.; (iii) wrong key to get the value; (iv) expired TTL for the key (expired
license and/or certificate); (v) key value not accessible (“lost”) on the DHT due to lack of
connection of the nodes that may have it; (vi) too high workload of some nodes, which does
not allow nodes to provide answers. Case (v) and (vi) can be reduced by tuning the DHT
parameters. For example, case (v) can be reduced increasing the number of replicas, at the
expenses of each single node’s memory of. Please note that the simulated solution aims at
keeping constant the number of replicas when some nodes leave the network. If all nodes
storing a given key-value leave the network at the same time (churn), the situation cannot be
recovered; while if some of them leave the network, the network regenerates other replicas.
Case (vi) also depends on replicas since with high values of replicas the value recovering can
be performed from other nodes. A high workload per node may be due to a very high
number of replicas or to a very low number of nodes with respect to the DHT size.
As to the considered DRM P2P simulation conditions, the setup of TTL, implying case
(iv), is not very relevant. Critical conditions are mainly present when a large number of
nodes leave the network in nearly same time bringing with them valid payloads. Therefore,
Table 1 Main parameters of the DHT P2P network in the experiments
Parameter Description Range of values
L Size of the leaf node list 8–400
Ltime Time to update the leaf node list 25–250 s
K Number of replicas per node 4–200
N Number of nodes involved in the network 1000–10000
Delay Offset delay of transmission 30–50 ms
Jitter Variability over time of the packet latency across a network 10 %
SendQueueLengh Max dimension of the output buffer 0.5 Mbyte
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during the whole simulation we assumed to have in the network relevant and useful
information, disappearing only due to the churn effects.
In most of the above mentioned failure cases, the client fails in accessing the payload
from the P2P, so that it starts to perform the request to the central PMS Server (Licensing
Server). Typically, the lack of getting an expired payload/information from the network
cannot be considered a problem for the DRM, since it implies in any case the failure of the
grant authorization algorithm. On the other hand, the return of a miss from the DHT due to
case (iv) would lead the client to perform the request to the central PMS Server, since the
requested license or certificate have expired, but a new one could be available on the PMS
Server due to a new license acquisition by the user. A client could start requesting expired
information, just to put in trouble the system. On the other hand, according to the model the
user and/or device insisting in performing this kind of actions (deny of service) can be
banned placing user or device in black lists and thus blocking the transaction in the first
verification protocol.
The adopted DHT P2P, based on Pastry, has a key of 20 byte; the space of keys is of 2160,
with a payload of 1Kbyte. The size of the payload is not influencing very much the network
performance, but the size of the memory allocated on the single node, instead. The key space
is circular as in other DHT, while the node ID is taken uniformly and not distributed on the
basis of geographical information.
The routing overlay network is created by discovering other nodes to create a list of leaf
nodes of L closest nodes (see Table 1). The time adopted by a node to perform the check and
update of its leaf node list is called Ltime. Every Ltime the node contacts one of its closest
nodes to exchange the leaf node lists, thus maintaining the network nodes connected, and
covering the possible disconnections with new entries. For high values of L, the Ltime has to
be large enough to leave time to the node to work and check the list.
5.1 Experimental results
In this section, the most interesting results related to the assessment of the DRM DHT P2P
solution with respect to critical cases are reported. To report the whole results performed in
the different cases and values, as described in Table 1, would be too space and time-
consuming and not useful to understand the effective results of this study.
A significant simulation has been performed by loading a DHT P2P network with about
100 payload values per user, and considering a network segment of 1000 nodes, N (client
users). Thus a total of 100.000 DHT entries / information stored. In the context of DRM, to
have an average of 100 payloads per user means to have an average of 100 rights/licenses
stored in the network per user. This is quite realistic for both cases: elements of the personal
health record or as acquired content items in pay per view. Moreover, if the number of
replica K is 200, each node/user client device could have a mean of 20000 elements per
device. This means to have about 20 Mbytes of memory space per device, thus allowing the
usage of the solution in classical media players for both PC and mobiles. These values can be
applied to a large network of 100 millions of users, for each of them 100 values stored, 200
replica, etc., and the same number of elements in the client device memory. The following
experiments have been performed to analyze these conditions.
Each experiment started with a setup phase to reach full capacity running conditions. The
setup phase consisted in:
& establishing a DHT P2P network with N nodes, putting them in execution and running
conditions,
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& loading key-payload couples in the DHT P2P network (the information loading is carried
out by a single node as in the case of the PMS Server described in Figs. 5 and 6), and
& waiting for stabilizing the replica distribution in the DHT P2P network.
After the setup, a phase of test has been performed by requesting to the network a number
of keys to verify the availability of all the data in the DHT (which means to start from the
condition where the missing level is zero), the stabilization of the network and measuring the
latency in responding to the requests, etc.
After the setup phase, a large percentage of nodes (from the 30 % to the 75 % in different
cases) has been removed from the network in less than ½ of the Ltime, to put in trouble the
whole system. A time interval for removing the nodes greater than the Ltime would permit
the network to reorganize and spread the list of leaf set among the closed nodes. Ltime was
set to 250 s, for the reasons reported hereafter.
On this basis, the response of the DHT P2P network has been assessed by analyzing the
response provided to 1000 requests of payloads (recovering values from the DHT entries by
key) from a uniform distribution of keys and nodes, as it would happen from a uniformly
distributed set of users, thus performing for each of them 1–2 requests in the different cases.
The results are reported in the following figures. From the operative point of view each
simulation took about 3 days on a 16 Gbytes of RAM, Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz.
Figure 7 shows the trends of the most relevant measures obtained from the DHT P2P for
the most relevant cases. The latency is the time of response of the DHT P2P network, when a
node asks for a key-value couple. In particular, with high values of replicas and a leaf set
imposed to ½ of the number of replicas. From the figures, it is evident what follows:
& mean number of keys per node remained stable and identical in both cases (a) and (b).
& percentage of missing is quite stable with respect to the churn size, as depicted in Fig. 7
and in large scale in Fig. 8.
& rest of the other figures have been scaled up of a factor of 2, by passing from first
conditions (a) to the second (b) in which both L and K have been doubled.
& latency (the response time of the network) is linearly dependent with respect to number
of replicas.
& P2P network responds quite well with respect to the disappearing of a high quantity of
nodes even if the nodes disappear in a very short time with respect to Ltime. On the other
hand, the number of miss drastically increases when the percentage of leaving nodes is
greater than 50 %.
The Ltime parameter has been set to 250 after the analysis reported in Fig. 9. From the
graph a minima has been identified close to that value. The estimated trend reported in Fig. 9
is due to two competing factors. When Ltime is low, the node workload to update the leaf set
is high since it is engaged in frequent connections with the other peers. On the other hand,
increasing L leads to increase the probability that some segments of the network are lost
when a large number of peers/nodes leave the network. In [28], it has been suggested to use
Ltime smaller than 360 to maintain the network stable.
As a conclusion, the adoption of DHT P2P for storing the DRM information is a viable
solution to reduce the connection workload of the central Licensing Server, namely the PMS
in the AXMEDIS MPEG-21 case. The effective adoption of the solution allows scaling up
the DRM without the need of having a strongly powerful infrastructure. The applicability
conditions of the proposed solution are related to the number of licenses per user and replicas
per license which is the average number of DHT entries in each P2P node – e.g., K*licenses
per user.
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Fig. 8 Trend of the percentage of missing, estimated on the DHT P2P for the cases of a churn of 30 %, 50 %
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Fig. 7 Trends of the most relevant measures performed on the DHT P2P for the cases presenting a strong
reduction of nodes, equal to 30 %, 50 % and 75 % of churn, with: L=2 K and K=100, K=150 and K=200. The
trend of the minimum number of keys has not been reported since the value is almost constant and equal to
1000 keys per node for any value of churn and K, the changes are in the order of 3 %
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For the case of TVevents, it is quite probable that the average number of DHT entries per
node is satisfactory since most users would be connected with their device. In this case, the
number of replicas can be maintained low, thus increasing the reaction time in any node
disappearing. For example, in Fig. 10, the trend of percentage of missing analysis, with 10
licenses per users, is reported. The graph reports the trend of network with different values
for K (replicas) (where L was set as above at 2*K). When K is bigger than the number of
licenses per user, the network shows a good performance level. Also in this case, the limit of
the 50 % for the churn has been detected. In fact, even in presence of 50 % of churn, more
than 80 % of the requests are going to pass from the DHT, thus reducing the workload of the
PMS to only 20 %. This reduction of workload implies a reduction of costs for the PMS
Server that needs to have only 20 % of network bandwidth and CPU usage.
For the case of EMR, the rights to be stored are related to the whole population, while
only a small percentage of them would be engaged in accessing the record at the same time;
this means that only a small number of nodes/players would be active. Moreover, the same
user may ask to get access to several DHT entries, since the patient record may have content
provided from different sources and thus different protection information. For this reason,
the closer conditions are reported in Fig. 8. In those cases, the number of replicas has to be
high to increase the probability that the data entry would not disappear from the network.
From the case of Fig. 8, a reduction of PMS workload higher than 50 % has been obtained
even when 75 % of nodes disappeared from the network. According to Fig. 8, a churn of
75 % with K=100 leads to have a reduction of network costs for the PMS server which
corresponds to more than 55 %. Figure 11 reports the comparison of PMS Server network
bandwidth as a function of the number of requests, both considering cases with and without
the P2P DHT network support. From the graph, the cost reduction is strongly evident. A
similar graph can be obtained for the CPU usage, since a reduction of requests arriving at the
PMS Server also implies a reduction of CPU usage. In order to be able to exploit such cost
reduction, the PMS Server could be deployed in cloud servers where the CPU and network
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Fig. 9 Trend of the percentage of missing estimated on the DHT P2P. With respect to the Ltime value for the
cases of a churn of 30 %, and different values of the number of nodes, N, with the same number of replica
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Fig. 10 Trend of the percentage of missing estimated on the DHT P2P with respect to different percentage of
churn, for K equal to 20, 16 and 8
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usage can be paid “as a service. See for example the elastic exploitation of resources
according to service license agreement of public cloud solutions in Amazon EC.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 5.1, the final user DRM clients could be no more
complex than the classical DRM based solutions without P2P support. This has been verified
in the cases of MPEG-21 AXMEDIS player for PC, and web browser plug in players. The
increment of memory usage has been in the order of few dozens of Mbytes.
On one hand, the percentage of users with active P2P nodes (accessing or not their own
EMR) could be smaller than 5 % of the population for which the DHT entries have to be
provided. On the other hand, a number of client tools would be quite stable by taking into
account those located in the hospitals, from the doctors, etc. We have in Europe about 280
people per doctor, this means that we can suppose to have a stable P2P node every 500 users
(thus 80000 nodes for 80 millions of users in a nation: German and Italy fall within that
range), and 80 billion of DHT entries (with 10 licenses per user, and 100 replicas). In these
conditions, a different solution has to be used, for example by adopting a set of super peers
as in [7], where the super peers are storing content files in their protected encrypted file
format by using controlled algorithms. According to this worst case, it means to have
500.000 DHT entries per client (that is 500 Mbytes of HD space used for the DHT). This
kind of peer node client, different from the peer node supposed to be used by the regular
users (as described in Section 5.1), may be engaged in providing response from 1 % of its
DHT entries. So that, it may receive about 5000 requests of 1Kbytes each. These numbers
can be supported by any client device connected to some DSL devices. Moreover, if these
super peers are supposed to be maintained active, the number of replicas can be reduced to
10, thus reducing the size of their memory to 50Mbytes which is again a memory size
comparable to that of regular clients mentioned in Section 5.1.
6 Conclusions
Digital rights management, DRM, solutions are today quite widespread in industrial appli-
cations. The complexity and costs for granting authorization according to some licenses is
typically demanded to a single central service which has to provide: (i) suitable storage for
the information, (ii) computational capabilities to compute the logical rules, and (iii)
networking capabilities to cope with millions of users requesting the grant at almost the
same time. The focus of this paper has been on reducing DRM costs by solving the
scalability problems behind the complexity of granting authorizations and on performing
verification for a large number of users, content and rights associated with them. The studies
and the solutions reported in this paper have been worked out and validated on top of
MPEG-21/AXMEDIS DRM solutions and tools. The proposed solution is based on the
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Fig. 11 Trend of needed bandwidth for the PMS Server with respect to the number of requests per second of
verification/authentication coming from the clients both with and without P2P solution, for K=100
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exploitation of the DHT P2P network and storage to cope with verification and grant
authorization. The main difficulties addressed in the paper have been (i) to find a solution
to store DRM information to perform in a P2P manner the verification and licensing,
including the information shape to be stored (see Section 4), while maintaining the security
level and tuning the P2P parameters, (ii) to restructure both client and server, while
maintaining the compatibility with the client–server solution without P2P, (iii) to prove that
the solution can be suitable and may effectively reduce the costs despite the user behavior in
terms of churns. The paper reported the AXMEDIS DRM solution and services in terms of
service graphs and action diagrams. This allowed highlighting the points where DRM
solutions can be adapted to exploit the P2P capabilities to reduce the complexity and costs
of the DRM service, by considering scenarios related to the user verification and grant
authorization from licenses. The identified parameters have shown that it is possible to
obtain a strong reduction of costs even in the present of churn greater than the 50 %.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 5.1, final user clients could be no much more complex
than the classical DRM based solutions without P2P support.
The solution proposed is general enough to be adopted in other DRM solutions since the
information stored into the P2P refers to the grant authorization and to the certification of
device which are functional to almost all DRM solutions. The performance analysis of the
DRM P2P solution aimed at fitting the DHT P2P into the specific cases by stressing the most
relevant parameters.
The experimental results highlight the parameters’ values of the DHT P2P which are
suitable for the applicative scenarios: the distribution of media content, and the management
of security for EMR/PHR. The work presented in this paper does not pretend to be an
exhaustive analysis of the security and protection problems of EMR, but only stresses that
DRM P2P can be one of the needed technologies to reduce DRM complexity.
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